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In this paper, I address the grounding problem for contemporary Russel-
lian panpsychism, or the question of how consciousness as an intrinsic 
nature is connected to dispositions or powers of objects. I claim that Rus-
sellian panpsychists cannot offer an adequate solution to the grounding 
problem and that they should reject the claim that consciousness, as an 
intrinsic nature, grounds the powers of objects. Instead, I argue that they 
should favour the identity theory of powers, where categorical and dis-
positional properties are identifi ed. I maintain that the identity theory 
serves as a better ontological basis for panpsychism since it avoids the 
grounding problem. Apart from that, I also argue that identity theory 
panpsychism is a position more parsimonious than Russellian panpsy-
chism since it introduces fewer entities while successfully avoiding the 
grounding problem. Based on these considerations, I conclude that iden-
tity theory panpsychism is an option worth considering.
Keywords: Panpsychism, grounding problem, categorical proper-
ties, dispositional pro perties.
1. Introduction
Panpsychism is the view that consciousness is a fundamental and 
universal feature of reality. Though this view might seem odd and 
counterintuitive at fi rst, there are many reasons for why we should 
take it seriously. These reasons largely follow the ex nihilo nihil fi t 
principle—consciousness must come from somewhere, it cannot come 
into existence from nothing, such as when unconscious fundamental 
particles arrange themselves to form conscious brains. The solution 
panpsychism offers—maintaining that those particles are themselves 
conscious—raises a few eyebrows. Despite its initial strangeness, the 
view has been gaining traction in current philosophy of mind.
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However, panpsychism faces a number of diffi culties. The most dis-
cussed of those is the combination problem, the question of how small 
subjects come together to form big subjects. While this is and probably 
will remain a serious issue, I will instead focus on a less discussed but 
equally challenging problem for panpsychism: how is consciousness, as 
something present within all objects at the fundamental level of real-
ity, connected to the dispositions or powers those objects exhibit?
In this paper, I argue that contemporary panpsychism, infl uenced by 
the ideas of Bertrand Russell, does not offer an adequate answer to this 
question. The reason for this is the ontological commitment of Russellian 
panpsychism to the idea that an object‘s intrinsic nature grounds or ac-
counts for its dispositions or powers. It is hard to see how this grounding 
relation can be explained without invoking further problematic notions. 
This is the grounding problem for panpsychism. I then offer a way of 
avoiding this issue by arguing that the panpsychist is better off accept-
ing the identity of intrinsic natures and powers rather than maintaining 
that they are ontologically different. Furthermore, through a discussion 
on intentionality and the directedness of powers, I demonstrate that pan-
psychism paired with the identity theory results in a more unifi ed ac-
count of objects and properties than the identity theory alone. Finally, 
after addressing several objections to the identity view, I conclude that 
the panpsychist who accepts it is better equipped to handle the ground-
ing problem than the Russellian panpsychist.
2. The Russellian Motivation
One of the main contemporary motivations for taking panpsychism se-
riously comes from Bertrand Russell, who argued (1927/1992) that ob-
servational science reveals only the mathematical structure of matter, 
without saying anything about what matter is intrinsically. Russell‘s 
approach has recently attracted renewed interest, forming a body of 
works which fall under the name of Russellian monism. Philosophers 
following Russell‘s line of reasoning think that consciousness is the best 
candidate to play the role of the intrinsic nature of matter, as it is the 
only such nature we know of. For example, William Seager has stated 
that consciousness is something we have “ready to hand” to play that 
role, and that nothing justifi es positing additional intrinsic properties 
except the verbal demand that it be “non-mental” (Saeger 2006: 137).
In addition to Russell, this argument has historic roots in the work 
of Arthur Eddington who argued (1928: 259) that science cannot reveal 
the nature of the atom since it only describes it in terms of pointer 
readings on instrument dials. However, in the case of pointer read-
ings regarding his own brain, it is clear to him that the readings are 
attached to a background of consciousness. If that is true, Eddington 
suggests that “the background of other pointer readings in physics is 
of a nature continuous with that revealed to me in this particular case” 
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(1928: 259). In other words, he argues that all physical facts should be 
attached to a background of consciousness:
If we must embed our schedule of indicator readings in some kind of back-
ground, at least let us accept the only hint we have received as to the signifi -
cance of the background—namely, that it has a nature capable of manifest-
ing itself as mental activity (Eddington 1928: 260).
Eddington’s argument appeals to parsimony, as it aims to show that 
it is more reasonable to presume that the background of pointer read-
ings is consciousness rather than something inherently non-conscious. 
As he puts it, attaching pointer readings to “something of a so-called 
‘concrete’ nature inconsistent with thought” would be “silly” if we are 
left wondering “where the thought comes from” (Eddington 1928: 259).
The form of Russellian panpsychism1 arising from these consider-
ations is committed to the claim that consciousness is the intrinsic na-
ture of matter which grounds all physical facts of reality. This claim 
can be cast in terms of categorical and dispositional properties. Dis-
positional properties are commonly defi ned as the directedness of an 
object towards a certain kind of manifestation, under appropriate con-
ditions (Jaworski 2016: 57). For instance, a vase has the disposition to 
shatter when struck. More broadly, a dispositional analysis describes 
how something behaves in space and time, under this or that condi-
tion. Categorical properties, in contrast, are defi ned as powerless or 
non-dispositional features of objects, such as their shape and size (Ja-
worski 2016: 55). A categorical analysis describes what an object is 
like “in itself ”, non-relationally. Russell‘s motivation for panpsychism 
can now be put as follows: observational science only reveals the dis-
positional properties of objects, but it is silent about the categorical 
properties that ground these dispositions. The idea that consciousness 
is the intrinsic nature of matter can be understood as the claim that 
consciousness is the categorical property of objects, while the physical 
facts it grounds are the dispositions of those objects. This view is a 
hybrid approach between pandispositionalism, the claim that all prop-
erties are fundamentally dispositional, and categoricalism, the claim 
that all properties are fundamentally categorical (Choi and Fara 2012). 
Russellian panpsychists, as described here, thus accept the existence 
of both categorical and dispositional properties but specify conscious-
ness as the universal categorical property of objects at the fundamental 
level of reality (Pereboom 2015).
3. The Grounding Problem
Russellian panpsychists are faced with an objection raised by Karen 
Bennett2 and further developed by Derk Pereboom (2015). Pereboom 
1 There are other forms of panpsychism, but I will focus my attention only on the 
particular form of Russellian panpsychism as described here.
2 Karen Bennett, “Why I Am Not a Dualist”, ms., as reported by Pereboom (2015).
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argues that micropsychists3 need to introduce brute laws4 in order to 
explain how “microphenomenal absolutely intrinsic properties” are 
linked to microphysical properties (2015: 317). Otherwise, the connec-
tion between microphenomenal and microphysical properties would 
be unintelligible. Pereboom (2015: 317) further argues that micropsy-
chism is ill-equipped to explain the properties revealed to us by cur-
rent microphysics, considering that brute laws generally provide no 
adequate explanations. Panpsychists thus need to account for how con-
sciousness, as a categorical property, grounds the dispositional proper-
ties of objects.5 To do that, they can either concede and posit inexpli-
cable laws, or say that there are no such laws.
The former option is equivalent to the necessitation relation dis-
cussed by David Armstrong (1978, 1983), Fred Dretske (1977) and Mi-
chael Tooley (1977) within the framework of their view on natural laws. 
Necessitation can be defi ned as the law-making universal N which 
holds between universals or natural properties F and G, so that if a 
possesses F, then a necessarily possesses G (Armstrong 1978, 1983). 
This form of necessitation is a brute law since it cannot be reduced to 
a more basic level, which is problematic because it fails to provide an 
explanation where there should be one, committing us instead to an on-
tology where the notions used are—by defi nition—unintelligible. This 
issue was clearly formulated by David Lewis, who has argued (1983: 
366) that Armstrong fails to provide a transparent account of neces-
sitation, and that a relation is not necessary simply in virtue of being 
called “necessary”. Considering that there are rival theories which of-
fer a coherent explanation of properties without invoking brute laws, 
the panpsychist is seemingly left without strong reasons to posit them. 
Naturally, a panpsychist could claim that other theories do not offer 
a satisfying explanation, arguing instead that we need to have brute 
laws. Without going further into this extensive debate, I limit myself 
to proposing a solution to the grounding problem which will not rely on 
brute and inexplicable laws.
The latter option results in several problems as well. If conscious-
ness is the categorical property that grounds dispositions, there is an 
immediate worry of how it could ground them if there are no brute 
laws. Positing consciousness as a categorical property is problematic 
unless it is in some sense connected to dispositions or powers. With-
out this connection, we end up with epiphenomenalism—the view that 
consciousness lacks causal effi cacy. For an epiphenomenalist, mental 
events (or tokens of conscious experience) are caused by physical brain 
3 Pereboom uses “micropsychism” for all views that see consciousness as present 
at the fundamental level of reality. This includes the form of panpsychism I am 
discussing.
4 Laws are brute when they have no further explanation or when they cannot be 
explained by appealing to something more fundamental.
5 In this context “categorical” and “dispositional” are interchangeable with 
“microphenomenal” and “microphysical”.
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states, but mental events themselves have no effects on physical events 
whatsoever (Robinson 2015). If the panpsychist were to choose this op-
tion, they would have to deal with the following diffi cult questions:
       a. How does consciousness ground dispositions without brute laws?
       b. How do they avoid epiphenomenalism, a largely unattractive 
view nowadays, or—alternatively—why should epiphenomenal-
ism be accepted?
       c. If there are no brute laws linking categorical and dispositional 
properties, then why do only certain types of physical systems 
result in consciousness?
Question c) might initially appear as a variation on the combination 
problem for panpsychism,6 but it is not. Instead, it is the following query: 
why would minds be specifi cally tied to brains (or any particular form 
of matter) if there were no laws linking categorical and dispositional 
properties? We have good reasons to accept a sort of parallelism be-
tween complex physical states and complex mental states: an intuitive 
and empirically justifi able answer to the question of why only human 
brains are capable of abstract and higher-order thought, as opposed to 
other animals, is that human brains are more advanced. A panpsychist 
claiming that there are no brute laws of grounding would have to deny 
this parallelism. In order to explain why only some physical states re-
sult in complex conscious subjects, the panpsychist would need to offer 
an account alternative to the claim that consciousness, as a categorical 
nature, is linked to certain types of physical or dispositional systems 
resulting in complex consciousness. Unless they introduce (brute) laws 
of grounding which hold between physical and mental states, it is not 
clear how they could explain the existence of such a parallelism, which 
is a largely uncontroversial concept. This is a big bullet to bite. How-
ever, this is not a reason to straight out reject a non- brute-law version 
of panpsychism. My intention here is only to show that this version of 
panpsychism leads to us having to accept a wide array of unappealing 
views. Because of that, I will try to develop a solution to the grounding 
problem which avoids these issues.
4. The Identity Theory of Powers
There is a way for the panpsychist to avoid the problems stated above 
and to offer a promising solution to the grounding problem. The iden-
tity theory of powers, discussed by Charles B. Martin (1994, 1997), 
John Heil (2003) and William Jaworski (2016), is uncommitted to the 
bifurcation of categorical and dispositional properties. For the identity 
theorist, “categorical” and “dispositional” only describe the differing 
theoretical roles properties play. In reality, though, there is no such 
6 The combination problem, in its most common variant, is the diffi culty of 
explaining how simple (or the simplest) subjects combine into more complex subjects 
(see Chalmers 2016 and Goff forthcoming).
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division: categorical and dispositional properties are one and the same 
thing. Every property possessed by an object gives it the power to inter-
act with other objects in various ways (Jaworski 2016: 57). To illustrate 
this, Heil (2003: 112) uses the example of a snowball, whose spherical 
shape is traditionally understood as a categorical property. He (Heil 
2003: 112) argues that the shape of the snowball confers to it the power 
to roll on a fl at surface. In other words, sphericity is a quality or cat-
egorical property possessed by the snowball, but at the same time its 
power. Jaworski (2016: 63) uses a clearer example—a diamond—and 
argues that the diamond’s hardness empowers it to scratch glass. In 
contrast, proponents of the hybrid view of properties would argue that 
the diamond’s tetrahedral arrangement of carbon atoms is a categori-
cal property which grounds its powers. The identity theorist argues 
instead that these descriptions denote different theoretical roles that 
one property plays—the categorical “is made out of carbon atoms” and 
the dispositional “scratches glass” role (Jaworski 2016: 54). In reality, 
though, the diamond’s structure simply is its power to scratch glass 
(Jaworski 2016: 54).
The panpsychist can accept the identity theory of powers as an onto-
logical basis and so avoid the grounding problem. This move indicates 
a step away from the Russellian view of consciousness as a categorical 
property which grounds dispositions or powers. However, it remains 
loyal to the basic Russellian motivation for panpsychism—the idea that 
matter must have an intrinsic nature. For the identity theory panpsy-
chist, consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous property which is 
at the same time categorical and dispositional; a quality and a power. 
Identity theory panpsychism solves the grounding problem by elimi-
nating the grounding relation: consciousness is no longer an isolated 
intrinsic nature serving as the categorical basis for dispositions but a 
property which fulfi ls both the categorical and dispositional role.
One distinct advantage of identity theory panpsychism over Russel-
lian panpsychism is that it normalises consciousness by giving it the 
same ontological status as it gives to every other fundamental prop-
erty. In Russellian panpsychism, consciousness is the categorical prop-
erty, the intrinsic nature of matter, given primacy over all other prop-
erties. In identity theory panpsychism, consciousness is a fundamental 
and ubiquitous property like every other such property (e.g. spin, 
mass, electric charge, colour charge). In other words, consciousness is 
a fundamental property whose existence we need to admit in order to 
explain how complex subjects come into being, not the fundamental 
property which grounds all others. The bifurcation of categorical and 
dispositional properties present in Russellian panpsychism is rejected 
here for a simpler model of powerful qualities or properties that are at 
the same time dispositional and categorical. Because of this, identity 
theory panpsychism is a more parsimonious view since it avoids intro-
ducing more than one type of property or “ultimate” categorical proper-
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ties. These are the positive reasons for why we should consider identity 
theory panpsychism as a serious option.
5. Objections to the Identity Theory of Powers
Before adopting the identity theory of powers, the panpsychist must 
fi rst address specifi c issues the theory faces in its own right. One very 
important issue was raised by David Armstrong, who argues (Arm-
strong, Martin and Place 1996: 95) that the categorical and disposi-
tional roles of a property must be related either contingently or neces-
sarily. He goes on to explain that if the relation were contingent, then 
it would be possible for the categorical side to have different powers 
“attached” to it, “or even with no powers at all” (Armstrong, Martin and 
Place 1996: 95). To turn back to an earlier example, this means that it 
would be possible for the diamond’s hardness to be correlated with the 
disposition not to scratch glass (Jaworski 2016: 78). This is not compat-
ible with the identity theorist’s view that the diamond‘s hardness is 
identical to its power to scratch glass (Jaworski 2016: 78). Armstrong 
(Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996: 96–7; as reported by Jaworski 
2016: 79) further argues that if the relation were necessary, then it 
would be unclear why the roles are necessarily related. Importantly, 
the proponent of the identity theory would have to introduce brute laws 
to explain why the relation between categorical and dispositional roles 
is necessary (as reported by Jaworski 2016: 79). This means that ac-
cepting the identity theory of powers does not avoid the brute laws is-
sue raised against panpsychism in the form of the grounding problem. 
Both panpsychism and the identity theory thus suffer from a version of 
the brute laws problem. If this is true, it would be devastating for the 
aims of this paper.
Luckily, there is a way of responding to this objection. The identity 
theorist could provide the following account of the categorical-disposi-
tional relation and argue that it is necessary:
[T]he reason why the diamond‘s hardness is necessarily correlated with the 
diamond‘s power to scratch glass is that the diamond‘s hardness is identical 
to the diamond‘s power to scratch glass. (Jaworski 2016: 79)
Armstrong fi nds this proposition “totally incredible”; claiming that it is 
a category mistake to identify categorical properties with dispositional 
properties; and concluding that “they are just different” (2005: 315). Ja-
worski responds by saying that Armstrong is begging the question: “To 
assume at the outset that qualities and powers are ‘just different’, as 
he says, is simply to assume that the identity theory is false” (2016: 79). 
In other words, when Armstrong claims that identifying categorical and 
dispositional properties is a category mistake, he is assuming without 
arguing that they cannot be identifi ed at all. For Jaworski (2016: 79), 
this alone is enough to reject Armstrong’s objection. Thus, while Pere-
boom‘s grounding problem does raise a valid point about brute laws to 
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Russellian panpsychism, Armstrong does not raise a valid point about 
brute laws to identity theory panpsychism. In the former case, there is 
an ontological bifurcation of categorical and dispositional properties, so 
Pereboom is justifi ed in demanding an explanation of the relation hold-
ing between those properties. In the latter case, there is no such onto-
logical bifurcation—“categorical” and “dispositional” are merely ways 
of describing the different theoretical roles a property can play. Hence, 
there is no need for an explanation of how these roles are related, unless 
one assumes (like Armstrong does) that these roles cannot be identifi ed. 
However, as was shown, this assumption is question-begging.
Armstrong raises one further important objection. He (Armstrong, 
Martin and Place 1996: 16) starts by explaining that it is not a neces-
sary truth that every power of an object is always manifested at some 
point of the object’s existence. If we imagine an object which has some 
power but never manifests it, then its power is directed towards a 
manifestation which does not actually exist (Armstrong, Martin and 
Place 1996: 16–7). For example, even in a world without water, sugar 
would still have the disposition to dissolve when put in water. This 
means that its disposition to dissolve is aimed at some non-existent 
manifestation—and Armstrong thinks that properties cannot “point 
beyond themselves to what does not exist” (Armstrong, Martin and 
Place 1996: 17). In other words, Armstrong (as reported by Jaworski 
2016: 58) is implying that the identity theory of powers is committed 
to Meinongian7 non-actual entities since it allows that dispositions or 
powers can be related to not-yet-existent manifestations. This is deeply 
problematic.
As a response, proponents of the identity theory can reject the claim 
that powers are real relations to their manifestations (Jaworski 2016: 
58). Instead, as Jaworski argues (2016: 58), the directedness of pow-
ers towards their manifestations can be understood through an anal-
ogy with intentional mental states. For example, I have a desire to eat 
pizza, but my desire can remain unfulfi lled. It is the same case with 
powers—salt has the disposition to dissolve, but its solubility does not 
stand in a real relation to its manifestation. It is directed towards it 
analogous to how my desire for pizza is directed towards pizza, even if 
all pizzerias in my town go bankrupt and close down (Jaworski 2016: 
57). In other words, the directedness of powers does not depend upon 
the existence of the manifestations they are directed towards (Jaworski 
2016: 58). If the directedness of powers can be conceived of as analo-
gous to intentional mental states, then the identity theorist can avoid 
the charge of being committed to Meinongian non-actual entities (Ja-
worski 2016: 57).
7 Alexius Meinong, an Austrian philosopher and psychologist, is known for 
introducing non-existent objects as part of his ontology (Marek 2013).
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Armstrong is suspicious of this solution. He (Armstrong, Martin 
and Place 1996: 17) claims that mental states have the property of be-
ing intentional, but expresses hope that they will ultimately be logi-
cally or empirically analysable. He thinks it strange and objectionable 
to put intentionality, or something like it, into the “ultimate structure 
of the universe” (Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996: 16). Similarly, Ja-
worski (2016: 58) stresses that the analogy between intentional mental 
states and the directedness of powers is merely that—an analogy. He 
claims, without providing an argument, that “intentional mental states 
are powers and the directedness of those states is a species of the di-
rectedness of powers in general” (Jaworski 2016: 58).
However, hopes and claims are not convincing arguments, which 
brings us to the question: why do Armstrong and Jaworski put the di-
rectedness of powers over mental intentionality? Their insistence on 
the primacy of directedness appears to be ad hoc. Otherwise, it could 
be understood as an intuitive argument, based on current sentiments 
in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Whatever the case, Armstrong 
and Jaworski did not extensively discuss reasons for why they give 
primacy to directedness of powers. They could argue that we have no 
reason to ascribe intentionality or any aspect of consciousness to non-
living matter since it does not exhibit behaviour we would characteris-
tically describe as conscious. However, what we fi rst observe as human 
beings is the fact that we are conscious and, as part of that, our ability 
to have intentional mental states. Indeed, the fi rst piece of knowledge 
we ever acquire is the knowledge of conscious experience. We know for 
certain that consciousness exists and that we are conscious, but we can 
never know for sure whether other living and non-living beings have 
conscious experiences. The solution to this was to ascribe consciousness 
based on behaviour: x is conscious because it behaves similarly enough 
to us, while y is not conscious because it does not behave similarly to 
us (or behave at all).
Is behaviour really a good criterion for ascribing consciousness? We 
could easily imagine a dormant super-intelligent being, or a being so 
advanced that we appear as non-conscious or barely conscious to it. It 
is a relative scale. Cats and dogs appear less conscious (or less com-
plexly conscious) to us, while plants and rocks appear non-conscious, 
but we could be so low on this scale relative to some existing or hypo-
thetical intelligence that we would then be the rocks. Less extravagant 
examples are comatose patients. While outwardly these people appear 
unconscious, brain scans strongly suggest that they retain some level of 
consciousness (Cyranoski 2012). Of course, we know that patients were 
fully conscious before they fell into a coma, but would not very simple 
conscious subjects, whose standard level of consciousness is very low, 
always appear comatose to us? We would have no way of detecting 
conscious activity in such subjects. Thus, behaviour seems more like 
a provisional and pragmatic criterion for consciousness rather than as 
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a certain nomic principle. Moreover, since we know that consciousness 
exists with more certainty than we know anything else, positing 
that there are things which are not conscious introduces a new kind 
of entity to our ontology—non-conscious existents.8 A more parsimoni-
ous view is one where consciousness comes in degrees, from rocks to 
amoebas to dogs to humans. That way, we avoid introducing a new 
and unproven ontological entity. The view that there are non-conscious 
existents has been so deeply ingrained into us that we cannot even 
consider the possibility that it might be wrong (or at least less explana-
torily powerful). Nonetheless, in conjunction with independent argu-
ments for panpsychism, I believe that we have good reasons to doubt 
that there are non-conscious existents.
6. Concluding Remarks
It is important to note that I have not been arguing for panpsychism 
in this paper. The discussion presented is aimed at philosophers who 
are already sympathetic to panpsychism. Specifi cally, in view of the 
grounding problem, I have argued that panpsychists are better off re-
jecting the Russellian ontological commitment to a hybrid view of prop-
erties, where the categorical grounds the dispositional. Instead, as I 
have claimed, there are good reasons for why they should accept the 
identity theory of powers as their ontological basis. The fi rst reason is 
that identity theory panpsychism avoids the grounding problem. The 
problem of needing to introduce brute laws between two things dis-
appears when only one thing with differing roles exists. The second 
reason, more positive in nature, is that identity theory panpsychism 
normalises consciousness by giving it the same status it gives to other 
fundamental properties, thus eliminating the need for introducing an 
additional special type of property.
Apart from addressing objections to panpsychism, I have also dem-
onstrated that the combination of the identity theory of powers and 
panpsychism successfully addresses objections raised to the identity 
theory in its own right. Most importantly, an identity theory panpsy-
chist has independent reasons for thinking that mentality, especially 
intentionality, is part of the structure of reality. In contrast, at least in 
cases addressed by this paper, Armstrong and Jaworski seem to merely 
assume that intentionality cannot be a part of reality and that primacy 
should be given to the directedness of powers. They are introducing 
more entities than panpsychism does to explain the same thing. Con-
siderations of parsimony thus push us to consider identity theory pan-
8 As a side note: The idea of matter being directed towards manifestations in a 
way analogous to intentionality, but without intentionality, is more mysterious to 
me than simply saying that this directedness is a form of intentionality, considering 
that we already know what intentionality is but have no idea of what the directedness 
of powers is, apart from the technical defi nition of the term and the demand that it 
involves no intentionality.
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psychism as the theoretically more adequate explanation. That is why I 
believe that the combination of panpsychism and the identity theory is 
indeed a powerful one, and that it could serve as a future starting point 
for many philosophers of mind and metaphysicians.
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